It is often claimed that we can’t really describe smells, or that our
ability to do so is severely limited. This is taken to show a limitation of our
language, a limitation that can’t be overcome. What is the source of this idea?
Clearly, we
do describe smells sometimes. A client may tell a carpenter about the way his
house smells. Say, there is a putrid smell, or a sharp, stinging smell in the
basement, or it smells like old wet rags, etc, and the carpenter may tell him
that there’s nothing to worry about, or maybe that the house suffers from dry
rot or mildew or what have you. Or a wine connoisseur might describe a wine to a
colleague, and his colleague might be able to tell what type of wine it was –
or they might disagree about the aroma of some particular wine, etc.
“But here we
are not really describing the smell itself, simply saying what the smell is
like. We’re not bringing the smell itself into words.” It will also be said
that what we miss is a smell vocabulary. Now strictly speaking this isn’t true,
there’s a whole range of words for describing smells (as illustrated here, for
instance). It is true, though, that our smell vocabulary is very generic, and that we
often try to be more specific either by referring to the source of the smell (it
smells of fish) or by comparing it to a smell identified by its source (it
smells like fish).
But why should
we think that in referring to the source or in invoking a similarity to a smell
coming from some source we are not describing the smell itself? What would it
be like to “describe the smell itself”? I should like to suggest that our thinking
here is under the spell of colour vocabulary. Colour words, we think, are a
paradigm of what it means to bring our very sensations into words. Colour words
mention only the visible property itself, independently of the object carrying
the property. The colour red is an abstract property compared to the smell of
fish, for instance.
Colour words,
however, are really a special case. Quite apart from the fact that the application
of colour words is not in reality wholly object independent (consider the difference
between establishing that a book is red, that an apple is red, that the sky is
red, and that someone is red in the face), colour, it seems, has no direct
counterpart when it comes to other perceptual properties. Our vocabulary for sound
or texture or even shape (felt or seen) is quite limited, and most of the time
we describe the perceptual qualities of an object by referring to the kind of object
it is (I felt that it was silk) or is like (it felt like silk). Where shapes
are concerned for instance, we have recourse to a few schematic concepts, which
do not apply to most natural objects, and when they do apply, it is usually
just by approximation. (We use the alphabet for recording spoken sounds, and we
have musical notation for musical sounds, but there is no general abstract vocabulary
for sounds.)
The relatively
abstract nature of colour vocabulary, I would imagine, is ultimately grounded
in our practices of painting or colouring objects; for instance in the fact
that we can use the same paint for a great many different kinds of object.
Colours, in
fact, provide a misleading paradigm of what it means to describe perceptual
qualities, leading us to say that smells “can’t really be described”.
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